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Abstract
Diﬀerent kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations,
in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in
selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select
core allocations in NTU games with diﬀerent concepts of robustness. Within a
uniﬁed approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in: the partnered core,
the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner
core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2003) that states
the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a
dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools
for selecting the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers:
C60, C71.
Keywords: Cooperative games, dependent balancedness, core selections in
NTU games.
R´ esum´ e
Dans cette note, on propose quelques applications directes d’un r´ esultat
d’existence de Bonnisseau et Iehl´ e (2003). Ces auteurs ont montr´ e l’existence
d’allocations du cœur dans les jeux NTU qui satisfont un ´ equilibre de taux de
transfert sous une condition de balancement d´ ependant. Il s’av` ere que la notion
de balancement d´ ependant procure en fait un outil manipulable pour s´ electioner
le cœur. Pour illustrer ce fait, nous montrons que cette notion permet d’obte-
nir des r´ esultats d’existence dans des mod` eles de cœur avec partenariat, cœur
socialement stable, prekernel moyen intersect´ e avec le cœur et de cœur interne
faible. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers : C60, C71.
Mots-cl´ es : Jeux coop´ eratifs, balancement d´ ependant, s´ elections du cœur dans
les jeux NTU.
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11 Introduction
The core of a cooperative game is the set of eﬃcient payoﬀs for the grand
coalition that cannot be improved by any coalition of players. One critic arising
from the core concept in cooperative NTU games is that some core allocations
may exhibit asymmetric dependencies (Reny and Wooders [13])1 or ineﬃciencies
if players agree for a transfer of utility (Qin [11, 12]). For example, at a core
allocation, some players could contribute more than others. Then, the stability
of the concept is questioned since the best contributors are likely to receive
rewards for their participation. A remedy consists in selecting the core, that
is, deﬁning a criterion to ﬁnd a utility vector that each member of the grand
coalition ﬁnds acceptable. Hence, by selecting the core, we mean prescribing
speciﬁc core allocations satisfying division schemes or stable matchings that are
robust with respect to asymmetries or ineﬃciencies. We review, in this note,
non-emptiness results with diﬀerent concerns and frameworks that all selects
speciﬁc core allocations in NTU games.
We propose a uniﬁed treatment based on a recent notion of balancedness
with a transfer rate rule, generalizing the extant notions, and called dependent
balancedness. The idea behind the notion is to consider a transfer rate rule
depending on the payoﬀs to deﬁne a notion of balancedness whereas the usual
transfer rate of the literature is supposed to be constant. It turns out that the
class of dependent balancedness games is exactly the class of games with non
empty cores 2.
Going beyond the non-emptiness of the core, it is also proved in Bonnisseau
and Iehl´ e [3] that dependent balancedness is a suﬃcient condition to get the
existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium. All the fol-
lowing selections of the core will coincide with a core allocation with a transfer
rate rule equilibrium. For instance, the authors deduce from their existence
result the non-emptiness of the partnered core of Reny and Wooders [13]. This
speciﬁc core selection is the set of core allocations such that, for any pair players
i,j, if the player i cannot achieve her core payoﬀ without player j then player
j cannot either achieve her core payoﬀ without player j.
As further applications, three other results will illustrate the role of the
transfer rate rule equilibrium, giving hints on its manipulation.
First, we turn to the non-emptiness of a social stable core. To deﬁne such
a concept, Herings et al. [5] introduce a power index for each players in the
coalitions. And then, they prove the non-emptiness of the set of equipotent
allocations in the core: the social stable core.
The second core selection is the average prekernel intersected with the core.
The prekernel is the NTU extension of the usual notion of prekernel at stake in
TU games. Though no interpretation is attached to the prekernel, it can be seen
as a fair sharing allocation with respect to a surplus measure of the players. We
improve the existence result originally given in Orshan et al. [8], by considering
1See also Bennett [2] and Bennett and Zame [1] for further developments on conﬂicts over
gains from cooperation.
2See details in [3, 10].
2the class of ∂-balanced games.
Lastly, we propose an existence result for a core allocation in the spirit of the
original notion of inner core of Qin [11, 12]. x is in the inner core if it is feasible
for the grand coalition, and there exists a transfer rate λ such that x is in the
core of the λ-transfer game. The inner core is included in the core, hence it can
be seen as a selection of the core. We exhibit a result for the non-emptiness of
a weak inner core.
To deduce these results as corollaries of the abstract result of Bonnisseau
and Iehl´ e [3], we construct explicitly a transfer rate rule for which the games
are dependent balanced.
1.1 Game description and the general result
We will use the following notations3: N = {1,...,n} is the ﬁnite set of players;
N is the set of the non-empty subsets of N, i.e. the coalitions of players; for each
S ∈ N, LS is the |S|-dimensional subspace of R
N deﬁned by LS = {x ∈ R
N |
xi = 0, ∀i / ∈ S}; LS+ (LS++) is the non negative orthant (positive orthant) of
LS; for each x ∈ R
N, xS is the projection of x into LS; 1 is the vector of R
N
whose coordinates are equal to 1; 1⊥ is the hyperplane {s ∈ R
N |
P
i∈N si = 0};
proj is the orthogonal projection mapping on 1⊥; ΣS = co{1{i} | i ∈ S};
mS = 1
S
|S|; Σ = ΣN and Σ++ = Σ ∩ R
N
++.
A game (VS,S ∈ N) is a collection of subsets of R
N indexed by N. x ∈ R
N
is called a payoﬀ; VS ⊂ R
N is the set of feasible payoﬀs of the coalition S;
S(x) = {S ∈ N | x ∈ ∂VS} is the set of coalitions, for which x ∈ R
N is an
eﬃcient payoﬀ; W := ∪S∈NVS is the union of the payoﬀs sets.
We will assume in the remainder of the paper that the two following assump-
tions are satisﬁed.
(H1) (i) V{i}, i ∈ N, and VN are non-empty. (ii) For each S ∈ N,
VS is closed, VS − R
N
+ = VS, VS 6= R
N, and, for all (x,x0) ∈
(R
N)2, if x ∈ VS and xS = x0S, then x0 ∈ VS.
(H2) There exists m ∈ R such that, for each S ∈ N, for each
x ∈ VS, if x / ∈ int V{i} for all i ∈ S, then xj ≤ m for all j ∈ S.
Note that under Assumption H1, there exist continuous mappings pN from
R
N to ∂VN, pW from R
N to ∂W, λN and λW from 1⊥ to R such that, for all
x ∈ R
N, pN(x) = proj(x)−λN(proj(x))1 and pW(x) = proj(x)−λW(proj(x))14.
Let us recall now the deﬁnitions of core and dependent balancedness, and, the
main result obtained by Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e [3].
Deﬁnition 1 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game. A payoﬀ x is in the core of the game
if x ∈ VN \ int W.
3For any set Y ⊂ RN, co(Y ), ∂Y , int Y will denote respectively its convex hull, boundary,
interior. For any set-valued mapping Γ, Gr Γ will denote its graph.
4See [3] for more details.
3Deﬁnition 2 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game satisfying Assumption H1: (i) A
transfer rate rule is a collection of set-valued mappings ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ) such that
for all S ∈ N, ϕS is upper semi-continuous with non-empty compact and convex
values from ∂VS to ΣS, and, ψ is upper semi-continuous with non-empty com-
pact and convex values from ∂VN to Σ. (ii) The game (VS,S ∈ N) is dependent
balanced if there exists a transfer rate rule ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ) such that, for each
x ∈ ∂W, if co{ϕS(x) | S ∈ S(x)} ∩ ψ(pN(x)) 6= ∅, then x ∈ VN.
Theorem 1 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game satisfying Assumptions H1 and H2.
If it is dependent balanced with respect to the transfer rate rule ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ),
there exists a core allocation x such that: co{ϕS(x) | S ∈ S(x)} ∩ ψ(x) 6= ∅.
2 Applications: four selections of the core
Theorem 1 downsizes the core into speciﬁc core allocations with transfer rate
rule equilibrium. In the following applications, the stake is to deﬁne indexes
for contribution, power or transfer and to prescribe an allocation in the core of
the game satisfying a division scheme with respect to these indexes. Thanks to
Theorem 1, we unify diﬀerent models where such a prescription is proposed. The
following results are all deduced as corollaries, the proofs are given in Appendix.
2.1 The partnered core (Reny and Wooders [13])
To get a ﬁrst application of this result, consider the following corollary of The-
orem 1, due to Reny and Wooders [13] and already proved in Bonnisseau and
Iehl´ e [3]. We recall before the notion of ∂-balancedness.
∂-balancedness The game is ∂-balanced if for all x ∈ ∂W and any
balanced family of coalitions B ⊂ N such that x ∈ ∩S∈BVS
then x ∈ VN.
Corollary 1 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a ∂-balanced game satisfying Assumptions H1
and H25. Suppose that for each pair of players i and j, there is a continuous
mapping cij: ∂W → R+ such that cij is zero on V (S) ∩ ∂W whenever i / ∈ S




(cij(x) − cji(x)) = 0.
The mappings cij can be interpreted as credit/debit mappings. Then, one
can see ηi(x) as the measure of the grand coalition’s net indebtness to i or
as i’s net credit against the grand coalition. The previous result states the
existence of a core allocation where the net credits of the players are all equal to
0. The result of Reny and Wooders[13] has been originally applied to a stable
5In Reny and Wooders [13], the result is stated for balanced games, it is slightly improved
by considering ∂-balanced games.
4matching problem. They state indeed that any balanced game has a non-empty
partnered core, which is the set of core allocations such that, for any pair players
i,j, if the player i cannot achieve her core payoﬀ without player j then player
j cannot either achieve her core payoﬀ without player j. Formally, a payoﬀ
x ∈ ∂W is said to be partnered if the family S(x) satisﬁes, for all i,j ∈ N,
Si(x) ⊂ Sj(x) ⇒ Sj(x) ⊂ Si(x), where Si(x) = {S ∈ S(x) | i ∈ S}, and the
partnered core is the set of all partnered core allocations.
2.2 Social stable core (Herings et al. [5])
In Herings et al. [5], the authors propose a generalization of NTU games.
Firstly, they assume the possibility of internal organizations, that is, inside a
given coalition, the members can choose among several possibilities of organiza-
tion, it give rise to a multiplicity of possible payoﬀs sets for the given coalition
6. Secondly, a power mapping that describes the power of agents inside each
organization is introduced. Under a balancedness condition, it is shown that
there exists an allocation lying in the core of the generalized NTU game and
such that the agents are equally powerful.
For each coalition S ∈ N, there is a ﬁnite number kS of possible internal
organizations. Denote IS = (IS
1 ...IS
kS) these organizations. Let I be the union
over S of all internal organizations. For each S ∈ N, each I ∈ IS, deﬁne a
payoﬀ set vI ∈ R
N. Now, deﬁne the power of an agent within an internal
organization by a power vector function p from I to R
N
+ \{0}. For each S ∈ N,
each I ∈ IS, p(I) ∈ LS+ \ {0}. A socially structured game is described by
(N,I,v,p). In Herings et al. [5], the authors restate Assumptions H1 and H2
for this generalized game. We omit their statements, it is an easy matter to
check that it amounts to consider that the game (VS,S ∈ N), where for each
S ∈ N, VS = ∪I∈ISvI, satisﬁes Assumption H1 and H2. Deﬁne the power cone
of a payoﬀ x as: PC(x) = {y ∈ R
N | y =
P
I∈I(x) λIp(I),λI ≥ 0, for all I},
where I(x) = {I ∈ I | x ∈ ∂vI}.
Deﬁnition 3 For a socially structured game, (N,I,v,p), a payoﬀ vector x ∈
R
N is socially stable if:
1 ∈ PC(x).
A core allocation is a payoﬀ vector x ∈ R
N such that x ∈ vI for some I ∈ IN
and x / ∈ int vI for all I ∈ I. A socially stable core is the set of socially stable
core allocations.
(SSG) If a payoﬀ vector x is socially stable then x ∈ vI for some
I ∈ IN7.
6The reader can imagine that possibilities of a coalition are described by special pairwise
links between its members that give rise to diﬀerent networks, (e.g. see networks formation
in Jackson [6]).
7This balancedness notion is sandwiched between the notion of b-balancedness of Billera
and that of dependent balancedness.
5We deduce the following result given in Herings et al. [5].
Corollary 2 Let (N,I,v,p) be a socially structured game and suppose that
(VS,S ∈ N), where for each S ∈ N, VS = ∪I∈ISvI, satisﬁes Assumption H1
and H2. Under SSG, the socially stable core is non-empty.
To prove the result, we will consider the transfer rate rule ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ) where:
ψ = mN, and, for all S ∈ N and all x ∈ ∂VS, ϕS(x) = co{
p(I) P
i∈S pi(I) | I ∈
I(x) ∩ IS}.
It is an easy matter to extend the result to parameterized games. It suﬃces
to apply Theorem 3.1 of Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e [3]. Furthermore, the param-
eterization could allow us to deﬁne a sharper model of internal organization,
continuously depending on the parameter set.
2.3 Average prekernel (Orshan et al. [8])
As another application, one can also prove the existence of an element lying
in the core intersected with the average prekernel (also called bilateral con-
sistent prekernel) as deﬁned in Orshan and Zarzuelo [9], see also Serrano and
Shimomura [14]. The average prekernel is the consistent extension of the usual
prekernel at stake in TU games. Furthermore, the most interesting feature is
that the following concept for multi-player games coincides with the Nash solu-
tion and intersects the core in a general class of games. We show how we can
deduce this existence result under an assumption of balancedness.
Deﬁne additionally, for each coalition, the set of individually rational pay-
oﬀs, IS = VS ∩ (∩i∈S(int V{i})c). Before introducing the average prekernel, we
need two additional assumptions on the game, namely non-levelness (NL) and
smoothness (SM).
(NL) For each S ∈ N, ∂VS is non-leveled, that is: if x,y ∈ ∂VS,
x ≥ y and y ∈ IS, then xi = yi.
(SM) At each point x ∈ ∂IN, there exists a unique vector p(x) such
that
P
i∈N pi(x) = 1. Moreover, for all x ∈ ∂IN, p(x) > 0 and
p is a continuous map.
Let us now deﬁne the individual excess functions, bilateral surplus functions
and total loss functions as follows:
For each x ∈ R
N, for each S ∈ N, for k ∈ S, the individual excess of k with
respect to S at x is :
ek(S,x) =

max{yk − xk | (yk,x−k) ∈ VS} if {yk | (yk,x−k) ∈ VS} 6= ∅
−∞ otherwise
For every k,` ∈ N, k 6= `, deﬁne the surplus of k with respect to ` at x to be
sk`(x) = max{ek(S,x) | S ∈ N,k ∈ S,l / ∈ S}.
For every k ∈ N and x ∈ ∂IN denote fk(x) =
P
`6=k (pk(x)sk`(x) − p`(x)s`k(x))
the total loss of player k at x. Let f(x) be the vector (f1(x),...,fn(x)).
6Deﬁnition 4 The average prekernel of (VS,S ∈ N) is the set:
{x ∈ ∂VN | f(x) = 0}.
In Orshan et al. [8], the authors have shown the non-emptiness of the core
intersected with the average prekernel in ∂-separating games, here the result is
improved by considering the larger class of ∂-balanced games8.
Corollary 3 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game satisfying Assumptions H1, H2, NL
and SM. If it is a ∂-balanced game then there exists a core allocation that belongs
to the average prekernel.
We will deduce the result from Corollary 1, but it amounts to consider the
transfer rate rule ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ) where: ψ(x) = mN − ˜ f(x), ( ˜ f(x) = f(x) up to
a normalization), and for all S ∈ N, ϕS = mS.
2.4 Inner core (Qin [12])
The inner core is an alternative way of downsizing the core. The main results
have been obtained by Qin [11, 12].
Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game compactly generated. And let λ ∈ R
N
+. Deﬁne a
real valued set function vλ on the set of all non-empty subsets of N by vλ(S) =
max
P
i∈S λi · yi | y ∈ VS
	
. Deﬁne the ﬁctitious λ-transfer game (V λ
S ,S ∈ N)







i∈S λi · yi ≤ vλ(S)
o
.
An allocation x is in the inner core of the game (VS,S ∈ N) if x ∈ VN and
there exists at least one λ ∈ Σ such that x is in the core of (V λ
S ,S ∈ N). Note
that the inner core is included in the core of (VS,S ∈ N). The requirements
imposed in the deﬁnition of the inner core are very strong. However, Qin [12]
proposes a class of balanced games for which the inner core is non-empty9. In the
following, we relax the deﬁnition and deduce from Theorem 1 the non-emptiness
of a weak inner core.
The interpretation of this weak concept of inner core diﬀers from the initial
inner core. We consider a group of players who agree for transfer rate rules
within each coalition. Then a global transfer rate rule is prescribed, this rule
must belong to the set of admissible transfer rates, deﬁned below. At this
prescribed rate λ, the players can transfer utility among themselves. The core
allocation x is in the weak inner core if x is an eﬃcient point in the ﬁctitious
λ-transfer payoﬀ set of the grand coalition.
Formally, the transfer set induced by the transfer rate mappings is deﬁned
as follows: for each x ∈ ∂W, TS(x) = co{ϕS(x) | S ∈ S(x)}. Then, (λ,x) ∈
Gr TS means that λ is an admissible transfer rate at the point x. λ deﬁnes a
ﬁctitious transfer game and one is led to the following deﬁnition.
8A ∂-separating game is ∂-balanced. See [8].
9The non-emptiness of the inner core is proved in games that cover the class of compactly
generated and balanced-with-slacks games.
7Deﬁnition 5 A pair (λ ∈ Σ,x ∈ ∂W) ∈ Gr TS is said to be internally stable
if:
(λ,x) ∈ Gr TS and λ · x ≥ vλ(N).
An allocation x is in the weak inner core of the game (VS,S ∈ N) if x belongs
to the core of the game and there exists at least one λ ∈ Σ such that (λ,x) is
internally stable.
Suppose the players can transfer utility at a prescribed rate λ. The pair
(λ,x) ∈ Gr TS is not internally stable if each player can get a strictly better
payoﬀ in the ﬁctitious λ-transfer payoﬀ set V λ
N. Denote NVN the normal cone
of convex analysis of the set VN.
Corollary 4 Let (VS,S ∈ N) be a game satisfying Assumptions H1 and H2.
Suppose also that VN is a convex set. If it is dependent balanced with respect
to the transfer rate rule ((ϕS)S∈N,NVN ∩ Σ), then the weak inner core is non-
empty.
We omit the proof of the last result which is a direct application of Theorem
1. To apply Theorem 1, it suﬃces to notice that the transfer rate mapping
ψ = NVN ∩ Σ satisﬁes the conditions of Deﬁnition 2(i).
3 A concluding remark
As a related topic, we want to mention that a recent stream of research deﬁnes
the notion of extended core, see Gomez[4] and Keiding and Pankratova [7].
The problematic is the following: in the case of an empty core, which feasible
allocations should be considered as potential candidates for guaranteeing the
stability? Brieﬂy, the construction of the extended core consists in blowing up
the feasible payoﬀ set of the grand coalition to get at least an allocation in the
core of the extended game. Then, two tools based on mechanisms, that either
downsize/select the core or blow up the payoﬀs are now available. They provide
a rich articulation around the core concept.
Appendix
Proof of Corollary 2. Let deﬁne the induced coalitional game (VS,S ∈ N)
where for each S ∈ N, VS = ∪I∈ISvI. Let us normalize the power mappings
by setting p(I) =
p(I) P
i∈S pi(I). Now, deﬁne the transfer rates rule ((ϕS)S∈N,ψ).
For each x ∈ ∂VN, ψ(x) = mN and for all S ∈ N and all x ∈ ∂VS, ϕS(x) =
co{p(I) | I ∈ I(x) ∩ IS}. It is now routine to check that the assumptions
of Theorem 1 are all fulﬁlled (Assumption SSG is actually a special case of
dependent balancedness).
Then there exists a core allocation (for the game (VS,S ∈ N)) x such that
co{ϕS(x) | S ∈ S(x)} ∩ ψ(x) 6= ∅. It can be rewritten as: there exist, for all
8S ∈ S(x), ρS ∈ R+, bS ∈ ϕS(x), such that
P
S∈S(x) ρS = 1 and
P
S∈S(x) ρSbS =
mN. Furthermore, bS ∈ ϕS(x) is equivalent to: for each I ∈ IS, there exist
νS
I ∈ R+ such that
P
I∈I(x)∩IS νS
I = 1 and bS =
P
I∈I(x)∩IS νS
I p(I). If we




i∈S pi(I), then one gets the
















I∈I(x) λIp(I) = 1. Secondly it is an easy matter to check that
x is in the core of the game (VS,S ∈ N) if and only if x is in the core of the
socially structured game (N,I,v,p) in the sense of Deﬁnition 2, as was to be
proved. 
Proof of Corollary 3. First, we remark that, without any loss of generality,
one can extend Assumption SM on the whole boundary of the set VN since the
core solution lies on the set of individually rational payoﬀs.
Lemma 3.1 If the game satisﬁes the non levelness assumption (NL), the map-
pings sk` are non positive and continuous on ∂W.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First, remark that for each x ∈ ∂W, one has x ∈ IS,
so non-levelness applies. The non positivity is straightforward from Assump-
tion H1. Furthermore, the mappings sk`, k,` ∈ N, are well deﬁned on ∂W
(consider the coalition T := {k}). We now show the continuity of the map-
pings sk` which derives from Assumption NL. Let k,` ∈ N, x ∈ ∂W and
denote S∗ the set of coalitions (satisfying k ∈ S∗ and ` / ∈ S∗) maximizing
ek(.,x), i.e. S∗ := argmax{ek(S,x) | S ∈ N,k ∈ S,` / ∈ S}; let xν be a se-
quence in ∂W converging toward x and denote, for each ν, Sν the set of
coalitions (satisfying k ∈ Sν and ` / ∈ Sν) maximizing ek(.,xν), i.e. Sν :=
argmax{ek(S,xν) | S ∈ N,k ∈ S,` / ∈ S}. We ﬁrst remark that, since S∗ is a
ﬁnite set there exists a real m such that for all ν ≥ m, Sν ⊆ S∗. Consider now
some T ∈ N such that T ∈ Sν for each ν big enough (taking a subsequence
if necessary), then from the deﬁnition of the mappings ek, there exist two real
numbers yk and yν
k respectively solutions of ek(S,x) and ek(Sν,xν) and sat-
isfying (yk,x−k) ∈ ∂VT and (yν
k,xν
−k) ∈ ∂VT. Now suppose we do not have
the convergence, that is, there exists  > 0 such that |yk − yν
k| >  for all ν
suﬃciently high. Then, taking the limit components by components, this con-
tradicts assumption NL. Indeed, it implies that (limν→∞ yν
k,x−k) and (yk,x−k)
belong to ∂VT, but |yk − limν→∞ yν
k| > , which is impossible. 
The mappings sk` are non positive on the boundary of the game ∂W and
continuous from Lemma 3.1. Let x ∈ ∂W ∩ VS for some S ∈ N with j ∈ S
and i / ∈ S, since: argmax{yj − xj | (yj,xS\{j}) ∈ VS} = {xj}. We deduce that
sji(x) = 0. Let cij(x) := −pj(pW(x))sji(x). Obviously, from the assumption
SM which guarantees the positivity and continuity of the mapping p, we deduce
that, for each pair of players i and j, the mapping cij: ∂W → R+ is continuous
and satisﬁes: cij is zero on V (S) ∩ ∂W whenever i / ∈ S and j ∈ S.
We deduce from Corollary 1 that there exists a core allocation x such that
for each i ∈ N,
P
j∈N(cij(x) − cji(x)) = 0.
9Equivalently, remarking that pW(x) = x on ∂W,
P
j∈N pi(x)sij(x)−pj(x)sji(x) =
fi(x) = 0. Hence, x is a core allocation that belongs to the average prekernel,
as was to be proved. 
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